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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the direct effect of family ownership on innovation in emerging markets by 
using data from Indian family-controlled publicly listed firms as its sample. In particular, we 
study (1) the direct effects of family ownership on innovation and (2) the influences of business 
group affiliation on these family firms. Using an unbalanced panel of 395 Bombay Stock 
Exchange (BSE) listed Indian firms during the years 2001 and 2008, we found that the impact of 
family ownership on innovation productivity is positive (after controlling for possible 
endogeneity). We further emphasized the business group affiliation of family firms and 
distinguished between the innovation activities of group-affiliated and stand-alone family firms. 
We found that affiliating with top 50 business groups increases the innovation activities of these 
family firms. Theoretically, we complement agency theory by incorporating both the institutional 
perspective and the external resourcing perspective to provide a more robust framework for 
examining the impact of family ownership on innovation in emerging markets. 
Methodologically, we adopted a more rigorous econometrics method by providing a panel 
analysis that used a system GMM estimator and addressed the endogeneity issue thoroughly, 
which represented a significant improvement over the shortcomings of the methodologies found 
in the existing literature.Our findings suggest that the Indian government should provide support 
for affiliating family firms with business groups while improving policies on information 
disclosures; it should also establish a proper corporate governance mechanism for private and 
public family business. The findings further suggest that a corporate governance code should 
encourage family firms to have an independent professional CEO.  
 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Patent, Innovation Productivity, Family Firms, Indian 
Business Group. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is a substantial body of literature that examines the characteristics and performance of 
firms with respect to innovation. However, there is scant evidence about a direct relationship 
between family ownership and innovation (Craig & Moores, 2006). This issue is more important 
for emerging markets than for markets in developed economies because globalization of 
emerging markets brings both opportunities and pressure for the domestic family-owned firms to 
innovate and alleviate competition for long-term survival (Aghion, Burgess, Redding & Zilibotti, 
2005). Furthermore, Choi, Park and Hong (2012) argue that prior agency theory literature that 
addresses the role of ownership structure on innovation from the agency perspective does not 
capture the relationship in the emerging markets.  
The literature on corporate governance has shown that the dynamics of ownership structure 
can influence technological innovation (e.g., Lee & O'Neill, 2003). Family ownership is the 
dominant form of business around the world and there is ample literature that studies family 
ownership issues (e.g., Villalonga & Amit, 2006). However, a salient aspect of that literature is 
the absence of studies on the effects of family ownership on firm innovation. The existing 
literature on this topic is rare and inconclusive from both developing (Chen & Hsu, 2009; Kim, 
Kim & Lee, 2008) and developed countries (Block, 2012; Sirmon, Arregle, Hitt & Webb, 2008). 
In addition, Le Breton-Miller, Miller, and Lester (2011) observe contradictory evidence of 
investment for innovation by family firms. For instance, one stream of the literature shows that 
family owners follow strategies of conservatism by maintaining regular income and restricting 
investment in innovation to avoid risk, which ensures the security of their wealth (Claessens, 
Simeon, Fan & Lang, 2002). Another stream of the literature argues that family owners and 
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managers sacrifice their personal interests to invest in innovation to make their firm healthy and 
durable and to enhance stakeholders’ value (James, 1999).   
Studies on blockholders of publicly traded firms suggest that the contribution of large 
shareholders to their firms often depends on their identity in particular institutional environments 
(Claessens, Djankov & Lang, 2000). In emerging markets, it is argued that weak investor 
protection, poor judicial systems, inefficient intellectual property protection, corrupt legal 
systems, under-developed capital markets and other institutional weaknesses make family 
ownership more concentrated, which inexorably affects firm performance (Khanna & Palepu, 
2000a). However, there have been only limited studies that directly examine the impact of family 
ownership on innovation, although it has been increasingly recognized that innovation can 
improve firm performance and firm value (Blundell, Griffith & Van Reenen, 1999; Cho & Pucik, 
2005). Furthermore, the limited studies on family ownership and innovation were undertaken 
either from an external resourcing perspective (e.g., Sirmon & Hitt, 2003) or from an agency 
perspective (Choi, Lee & Williams, 2011; Morck & Yeung, 2003). There is no noteworthy study 
that attempts to reconcile agency theory and institutional theory to investigate the impact of 
family ownership on firm value (Liu, Yang & Zhang, 2012; Peng & Jiang, 2010), which opens 
an avenue to explore this important yet undeveloped issue. This issue is relevant and important to 
emerging markets because these markets have underdeveloped institutions (or no institutions); 
this hinders the functionality of markets, such as Indian markets, in which large family business 
groups are some of the most important drivers of innovation and are responsible for large parts of 
the country’s economic growth (Chakrabarti, Megginson & Yadav, 2008; Piramal, 1996). 
 Based on these gaps in the literature, this study aims to complement the agency theory by 
incorporating both an institutional perspective and an external resourcing perspective to provide 
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a better framework for examining the impact of family ownership on innovation in emerging 
markets, by using Indian family-controlled publicly listed firms as its sample. In particular, we 
study (1) the direct effect of family ownership on innovation and (2) the influence of business 
group affiliation of these family firms on innovation. We use a unique data set of 395 Indian 
firms1 listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange between the years 2001 and 2008 as our sample. 
 Methodologically, we adopt a panel data set of patenting information on these firms around 
the world that no existing literature in this field has analyzed. This data set reveals intra-firm 
variations in innovation. Controlling for time-varying decisions of the firms to remain family 
owned and for other sources of endogeneity, we apply a well-developed system GMM estimator. 
After addressing reverse causality between family ownership and innovation, our results show 
that Indian family ownership increases innovation output and improves firms' innovation 
capacity. We also find that affiliating with top business groups contributes significantly to 
improving firms' innovation. 
We focus our study on Indian firms because India typifies emerging markets that feature 
institutional underdevelopment (absence of or underdeveloped institutions that prevent the 
functioning of intermediate markets) and is a good example of a market with dominant family 
ownership. Approximately 70 percent of the Indian firms are family-controlled and they are the 
driving forces of innovation in India because of the absence of other types of concentrated 
ownership, such as state-owned firms (Chakrabarti, Megginson & Yadav, 2008; Piramal, 1996). 
These family firms usually engage with the government opportunistically; thus they are not 
always closely associated with politicians (such as Chaebol in South Korea). Indian family firms 
are free from rigging markets (such as Mexico and Israel) and are also under market pressure 
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imposed by new entrant competition. These features make Indian family firms unique and 
distinguish them from comparable firms in other emerging markets. 
Moreover, Indian family firms have another distinct feature. Most are affiliated with large 
business groups for external resourcing (Khanna & Palepu, 2000b)2. A number of studies have 
recognized that business groups in emerging economies can mitigate the distortion of the labor 
and capital markets and that group-affiliated firms can share a group-wide reputation that might 
offer access to external credit (Claessens, Djankov & Lang, 2000; Khanna & Palepu, 2000b). 
Because the groups create their virtual (internal) capital markets (Manos, Murinde & Green, 
2007), the group-affiliated family firms can pool and re-allocate funds in accordance with 
investment opportunities (Bertrand, Mehta & Mullainathan, 2002). These features of business 
groups in India make group-affiliated family firms an important business arrangement to 
compensate for institutional underdevelopment (also used as institutional voids in many studies) 
and an inefficient capital market. Therefore, we argue that the affiliation of Indian family firms 
with business groups can positively influence the relationship between family ownership and 
innovation, which makes the impact of family ownership on innovation even more unique in 
India compared to developed and other developing economies. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review 
and hypotheses development. Section 3 introduces the dataset and describes the variable design 
and econometric models. The penultimate Section 4 explains the empirical results, which 
includes robustness tests. Section 5 concludes the study with implications.  
 
 
7 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Family ownership and innovation 
Innovation is the process of developing new technological knowledge and putting that 
knowledge to productive use. Cohen and Klepper (1996) differentiate innovation as process and 
product innovation – process innovation reduces production costs and product innovation 
increases the price that consumers are willing to pay. Both types of innovation are associated 
with the following risk factors: (1) The probability of the failure of R&D investment is higher 
than that of conventional investments; (2) new technologies tend to be opaque (Rajan & 
Zingales, 2001), which means that innovation is often less understood by market participants; 
and (3) the expected return on new technology depends on the firm’s lead-time advantage, which 
means that the possibility of imitation by competitors may decrease the profitability of successful 
innovation projects (Helpman, 1993). Therefore, successful innovation requires sufficient 
innovation investment (such as R&D, marketing, programs to educate consumers about new 
technologies and products), and investment in external resourcing (such as attracting and 
retaining entrepreneurs and talented scientists).  Therefore, well-developed financial systems are 
desirable for innovation (Hyytinen & Toivanen, 2005). 
The ownership structure of a firm is an important determinant of its innovation activities (Lee 
& O'Neill, 2003) because ownership concentration may efficiently resolve agency problems or at 
least so it has been argued (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Large shareholders that care about the 
stability of the firm focus on long-term investment in new technology development even though 
it may mean temporary fluctuations in stock prices (Choi, Park & Hong, 2012).  
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Family control is the dominant form of business around the world, but particularly in 
emerging markets; it is typically unchallenged by other equity holders (La Porta, Lopez-De-
Silanes & Shleifer, 1999). In many instances, family-owned businesses take the form of a small 
family business, whereas it is a large business employing hundreds, or even thousands of staff in 
other cases. For instance, studies document that one-third of the S&P 500 (Anderson & Reeb, 
2003) and Fortune 500 (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986) firms are family firms. In emerging markets, 
the large family-controlled business structure is far more common (Manikutty, 2000), and this 
has particularly significant effect on innovation because these large family firms possess the 
advantages in R&D investment and economies of scale that are required for successful 
innovation. India is a good example of this type of emerging markets because approximately 70 
percent of Indian firms are family-controlled and large family-controlled business is a driving 
force of innovation in India because of the absence of any other type of concentrated ownership 
(e.g., Piramal, 1996).  
The extant literature on family ownership and innovation 
In family-controlled businesses, it has been argued that the most severe agency problems result 
from the conflict of interest between majority shareholders and minority shareholders (La Porta, 
Lopez-De-Silanes & Shleifer, 1999). Therefore, the influence of family ownership on firm 
innovation originates from how well the two parties work together to reduce the agency problem 
and optimize resource allocation (Belloc, 2012). On the one hand, the advantage of family-
controlled business is that concentrated family ownership means a high level of family 
involvement in the firm, particularly when the founders of the family serve as CEO or are on the 
board of directors. They have a strong attachment to and interest in their firms. Therefore, the 
incentive alignment argument is overwhelming and it reduces the agency problem between 
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family (majority shareholder) and other equity holders of the firm (minority shareholders). More 
recently, there have been studies that extend agency theory to explain the impact of family 
ownership and innovation by incorporating stewardship theory. These studies show that the 
family normally holds its stakes for a long time and targets greater benefits, such as the firm’s 
growth, technological innovation and long-term firm survival (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Le 
Breton-Miller, Miller & Lester, 2011). Moreover, family ownership tends to invest in R&D and 
technological innovation rather than opting for the traditional approach of sales maximization for 
short-term profitability. Therefore, family ownership should have a positive effect on a firm’s 
innovation activities. 
On the other hand, however, it has also been argued that family owners tend to expropriate 
corporate wealth because they hold a significantly great percentage of the outstanding stock and 
usually dominate the board of directors (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 2000). 
When this behavior arises, it creates a significant agency problem between majority shareholders 
and minority shareholders. When insider family owners expropriate outside investors by 
diverting corporate resources for their personal interests, it is difficult to raise financing for 
technological projects and to allocate capital to invest in innovation (Morck, Wolfenzon & 
Yeung, 2005). Therefore, the impact of family ownership on innovation might be negative. 
Thus far, there are only limited empirical studies to test the above theoretical arguments and 
they have focused mostly on R&D activities in family-controlled business, leaving the direct 
examination of the role of family ownership on innovation unexamined. Moreover, because the 
empirical evidence comes from both developed and emerging markets, the results are 
inconclusive.  
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Studies in developed economies note that founding families - because they are aware of the 
learning curve of their firms - generally have insider knowledge of R&D activities (Anderson & 
Reeb, 2003), which enhances innovation capabilities. In addition, by holding large equity 
ownership portions of these firms, founding families tend to want to invest more in R&D (Block, 
2012). However, using survey data collected by Banque de France, Sirmon et al. (2008) show 
that French family firms maintain higher investment in R&D than non-family firms, which leads 
to higher innovation performance, but the innovation performance decreases as the level of 
ownership held by families increases.   
In Korea, another emerging market, Kim, Kim, and Lee (2008) show that family members 
are more willing to invest in long-term projects- such as R&D- for their firms than other 
shareholders. Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2011) study 19,000 firms across 47 
developing countries and find that controlling families improve a firm’s innovation activities. 
However, investigating data from Taiwanese family firms, Chen and Hsu (2009) argue that 
family members may abuse their power and misuse the funds, which leads to decreasing R&D 
intensity. 
Gaps in the Literature  
The prior literature on agency theory indicates that agency theory- even when reconciled with 
stewardship theory- cannot provide a convincing explanation for the role of family ownership on 
innovation because the agency framework has yet to fully address the influence of the 
institutional settings of emerging markets.  La Porta et al. (1999) argue that the agency problem 
between majority and minority shareholders- and the effectiveness of the agency framework to 
reduce the agency problem is largely influenced by the institutional environment, such as poor 
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protection of minority shareholders. In addition, in emerging markets, the use of pyramidal 
groups to separate the cash flow rights from the voting rights of majority family owners lead to 
the entrenchment of the dominant family. One of the dominating mechanisms of this type of 
expropriation of minority shareholders in emerging markets is transferring (tunneling) a 
significant proportion of wealth by the family owners from firms in which they have large 
control rights to firms in which they have both large cash flow and control rights (Johnson, La 
Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes & Shleifer, 2000; Morck & Yeung, 2003). This tunneling of assets in 
the pyramidal structures of family firms leads to gain by the family at the expense of other 
stakeholders. Recent studies have documented such problems in family business groups in 
Western European and East Asian markets (Claessens, Djankov & Lang, 2000; Faccio & Lang, 
2002). Because of persistent tunneling, the agency conflict may decrease revenues and affect the 
innovation activities of family firms.  However, the literature has not fully addressed the 
complex relationship between family ownership and its influence on innovation, particularly in 
emerging economies. Therefore, the first gap we have identified in the existing literature is that 
there is a lack of evidence to help reconcile certain conflicting results from agency theory and the 
institutional perspective to explain the role of family ownership on innovation. 
The second gap we have identified in the literature is that there are limited empirical studies 
that have examined family ownership and innovation from an external resourcing perspective in 
emerging markets. With respect to the external resourcing perspective, this issue is particularly 
important in India because a large number of Indian family firms are affiliated with business 
groups that are the primary channel of providing and accessing resources (Piramal, 1996). As we 
mentioned earlier, innovation activities significantly depend on external resourcing (technology 
transfers, attracting and retaining talented scientists, FDI, etc.), which is also influenced by the 
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institutional framework of any specific country. Therefore, this raises the question of how Indian 
family firms can enhance innovation through external resourcing with weak institutions. 
Hypothesis Development 
The type (and degree) of agency problems in listed firms is largely affected by ownership 
structure and institutional environment (La Porta, et al., 2000). We will investigate how the 
ownership structure of listed family business shapes agency problems and how the relationship 
between family ownership and innovation may be affected by variation in the institutional 
framework. 
The literature argues that, in developed economies such as the United States or the United 
Kingdom, better legal protection for shareholders (particularly for minority and outside 
shareholders) encourages founding families and the family members to dilute their equity (Peng 
& Jiang, 2010). The concentration of ownership in listed family business is much less in 
developed countries than in emerging markets (Khanna & Palepu, 2005). The ownership 
structure of listed family firms in developed markets is dispersed compared to that in emerging 
markets; thus, in developed markets, the agency problem between majority and minority 
shareholders is not of major concern (La Porta, et al., 2000), and the dominant agency problem is 
conflicts of interests between owners and managers (Morck & Yeung, 2003).  
A special feature of family business in India is that large firms belong to family business 
groups in affiliation with business groups (Chakrabarti, Megginson & Yadav, 2008). In business 
groups, the family firms control other firms; following a pyramid structure, each firm again 
controls many other firms (Morck & Yeung, 2003). Although public shareholders provide capital 
at different stages of the pyramid structure, they do not become the majority shareholder in any 
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family firm affiliated with the group, and their role in providing capital and corporate 
governance related activities is insignificant (Morck & Yeung, 2003).  
In addition to this pyramid ownership structure and similar to other emerging economies, 
India is also characterized by the absence of sufficient judicial and regulatory institutions, which 
leads to a variety of market failures that are characterized by inadequate disclosure, weak 
corporate governance and weak securities regulation. The combination of an undeveloped 
institutional framework and inefficient capital markets encourages concentrated family 
ownership; thus, founding families hold a majority of equity ownership of their firms to maintain 
sufficient control (e.g., Khanna & Palepu, 2000b). A larger proportion of ownership in the hands 
of few owners, such as founding families, motivates them to monitor managerial decisions, to 
minimize managerial agency costs (Anderson & Reeb, 2003) and to take measures to protect 
their firms’ interests. Burkart et al. (2003) argue that the less that the outside investors is 
protected legally, the greater the need for large family shareholders that can minimize the agency 
problem between owners and managers in a emerging market. Moreover, managers in publicly 
traded family firms tend to develop a reputation for not expropriating minority shareholders and, 
consequently, minority shareholders support the family owners because the family owners 
control the managers in emerging markets (Gomes, 2000). Therefore, it is expected that 
managers in family firms are more likely to be aligned with the founder family so that the 
conflict of interest between minority shareholders and family owners in India is more likely 
minimized. 
In addition, the large shareholders of the firm can influence the allocation of scarce resources 
for competitive and challenging investments such as in innovation and monitor how the 
investments are being utilized (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson & Grossman, 2002). Because of the 
14 
institutional underdevelopment in the markets in India, the high level of interaction, common 
understanding, and natural alignment of interests between family members and employees 
enables the family owners to integrate any individual specialized technological knowledge either 
family members or employees may have (Chirico & Salvato, 2008). These firms are strongly 
embedded in the society (Fuller & Tian, 2006) and are often recognized as successful 
entrepreneurs who can communicate their new ideas more effectively with their governments. 
These owners can obtain social and political capital, secure the supply of raw materials, 
financing and government contracts (Singh & Gaur, 2009); all of which enhance technological 
innovation. Their economics of scale and technological competence are far superior to other 
types of firms (Chirico, & Salvato, 2008). They also have strong social and cultural influences in 
the society and maintain good links with government agencies and can thus protect their 
innovation technologies (patents) and products (Singh & Gaur, 2009). It is plausible that 
concentrated Indian family firms may focus more on utilizing resources in innovation to enhance 
firm performance than on expropriating minority shareholders. 
In summary, although the same types of agency problems in firms of developed markets exist 
afflict family firms in emerging markets such as India (e.g., the agency problem between 
majority and minority shareholders, between owners and managers or between two family firms 
affiliated within the same business group), we argue that the degree of such agency problems, 
particularly between majority and minority shareholders, are less severe. The benefits of 
concentrated family ownership that help overcome institutional underdevelopment and facilitate 
in obtaining external resources outweigh these agency costs, and these benefits are essential for 
technological innovation. Whereas the agency theory drives the internal corporate governance 
mechanism, external mechanisms, such as institutional development, complements the impact of 
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family ownership on innovation in emerging markets and promotes the evolution of dynamic 
capabilities for innovation in family firms. We thus propose our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Family ownership in India has a positive impact on the innovation activities of 
family firms. 
Affiliating with business groups of Indian listed family businesses enables certain 
institutional underdevelopment to be filled and controls certain agency problems in firms; 
business groups are able to perform intermediating functions and mitigate resource 
diversification costs. 
Strong intermediary institutions provide the necessary financing, technology and 
management talent for innovation in developed markets (Munoz-Bullon & Sanchez-Bueno, 
2011). However, these facilitating intermediary institutions are absent in emerging markets, such 
as India, because of institutional underdevelopment, which motivates the Indian business group 
to support its innovation activities. Unlike developed markets, in the emerging markets, large 
business groups act as intermediary institutions between family firms and the imperfect market 
(Khanna & Palepu, 2000b). In other words, these business groups, although they are structurally 
different from US conglomerates or Japanese keiretsu (owned by large banks), often replicate the 
function of stand-alone intermediary institutions in developed markets. The group-affiliated 
Indian family firms can obtain access to ‘internal capital markets’ for funds and utilize group 
reputation for other essential external resources for innovation activities (Almeida & Wolfenzon, 
2006). Khanna and Palepu (2000b) empirically show that affiliation with large Indian business 
groups increases firm performance by overcoming external institutional underdevelopment in the 
Indian market.  
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As a result, these business groups can also mitigate the cost of their diversification because 
they restrict the use of the internal capital markets to prop up inefficient operations, and 
transaction costs during business operations are minimized. In his seminal study on the role of 
the business group to mitigate capital market distortion, Leff (1976) argues that the group 
structure provides a mechanism to mobilize managerial talents and technological knowledge, in 
addition to helping affiliated firms to access internal capital markets, which addresses the need 
for efficient external capital markets (Almeida & Wolfenzon, 2006). Family ties within business 
groups can also provide unconditional trust and an organizational culture of altruism and 
stability, which combine to reduce transaction costs that result from information asymmetry and 
disputes. The success of innovation is often uncertain and invites risks that require trust and 
understanding among family members and employees. Intense interactions among group 
affiliates help to achieve trust and confidence and to increase the likelihood of sharing risks 
(Zahra, 2003). Therefore, affiliation with large business groups can help family firms perform 
more effectively in the presence of institutional underdevelopment and resolve certain 
information and transaction costs in emerging markets (Chu, 2004). Khanna and Palepu (2000b) 
show that the largest and the most diversified business groups in India perform well; in addition, 
they share their reputations and political connections among themselves. 
Thus we develop our second hypothesis as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: Business group affiliation positively influences the relationship between family 
ownership and innovation, such that family firms affiliated with business groups are more 
innovative than standalone family firms in India. 
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DATA AND VARIABLES 
Data Source 
Our data sources include (1) the PROWESS3 database that is maintained by the Center for 
Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE) and (2) the PATSTAT database available through the 
European Patent Office. We collected ownership data from PROWESS during 2001 and 2008 
and considered ownership being held by the ultimate owner listed on the Bombay Stock 
Exchange (BSE). These firms are required to follow norms set by the Securities and Exchange 
Board of India (SEBI), India’s securities market regulators, in announcing financial accounts.  
 
Sample Construction 
We eliminated observations in which the reported data were not annual. In addition, we also 
dropped observations that had more than 50 percent foreign ownership. Further, following Chari 
and David (2011), we eliminated observations that showed an unusually high (above 50 percent) 
or low (below 50 percent) return on assets, as this information might consist of large asset 
selloffs or purchases. 
We excluded financial institutions from our study. Financial institutions are generally 
professional investors with significant experience with historical returns. Thus, they act 
differently than individual shareholders. Naturally, institutional investors choose to invest in 
companies with higher productivity potentials. In addition, because Indian banks do not belong 
to business groups (Khanna & Palepu, 2000b) and because we are investigating the effects of 
business groups on the innovation of family firms, we also excluded banks. 
Because we required firms to have active R&D (i.e., firms that have filed at least one patent 
application), we extracted all patent information related to Indian firms from PATSTAT and 
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found that these firms filed approximately 10,000 patents in various patent offices around the 
world. Because, our focus is to track the innovation activities of family firms, we considered the 
patent filing year (first filing) as the reference year for our dataset. Because PATSTAT has the 
raw data for all patents filed in more than 80 countries around the world, the hard task is to find a 
common identifier to match this patent data with ownership data obtained from PROWESS. We 
cleaned the names of Indian firms4 and took these firm names (strings) to match with firm names 
obtained from PROWESS. We used the Levenshtein distance algorithm (sometimes called edit 
distance) for coding and grouping firm names. This provided us with a sample of 428 matched 
firms that had active patents recorded in PATSTAT. Because the ownership data available from 
2001 to 2008 are from the PROWESS database (2008 version), after matching the two datasets 
and excluding state-owned firms (in which the government holds more than 50 percent of a 
firm’s shares) and addressing missing data and outliers in key variables, we settled on an 
unbalanced sample of 395 firms with 7065 patents and other financial data for the 2001-2008 
period. Although only 395 listed family firms remain, we argue that the sample does not lose 
representativeness for the entire population of publicly listed family firms, which are the focus of 
our study, for the following six reasons. First, because it is a signatory to TRIPs (Trade related 
aspects of intellectual property rights), India started product patenting in 2005 in many areas of 
technology. Therefore, before 2005 we had much less and less-complete patent information that 
were mostly related to process patenting (Chadha, 2009). Second, because of India’s weak 
institutions, such as weak patent policy, many firms have not patented their technology and 
innovation (Deolalikar & Evenson, 1989). Third, patent applications require large amounts of 
R&D investment and often require a significant amount of time to progress from application to 
granting patents. Therefore, we obtained patent information only for those firms that can afford 
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these processes. Fourth, on the basis of the preceding explanation, we assume that only firms that 
are able to bear the cost of patenting and are well known in the financial market for their high 
R&D activities are providing their patent information. In India, these firms are publicly traded on 
the Bombay Stock Exchange; publicly listed family firms, which are the focus of this study, are 
the majority of these firms. Moreover, after matching 10,000 patents retrieved for Indian firms 
with CMIE ownership data, we obtained 7065 patents. Therefore, we obtained 70 per cent of the 
patents and used this information to construct the main dependent variable in our model. From 
this perspective, our sample is largely representative of publicly listed family firms. Fifth, there 
might be a possibility to model firms without any patent information by using Heckman 
correction and including an inverse Mill’s ratio in the regression. We have tested that and found 
no significant differences from our reported results. Sixth, and finally, our sample size is also 
consistent with other studies on family ownership and business groups in emerging markets. For 
example, Singh and Gaur (2009) used only 400 Indian firms, whereas Peng and Jiang (2010) 
used 634 family firms for seven emerging markets in their studies.  
Variables 
We considered the patent-R&D ratio as proxy for the dependent variable- innovation 
productivity- because input (research efforts, such as R&D expenses) and output (patent numbers 
or number of products) can be observed from available data, but the intention (inventions) of the 
inventor or firm cannot. In addition, there is a linear homogeneous relationship between input for 
innovation, such as R&D expenditure, and output, such as patents or products (Coe & Helpman, 
1995). Cohen and Klepper (1996) argue that R&D activities lead to invention, which eventually 
result in product or process innovation. To capture this effect, we followed the study of Lanjouw 
and Schankerman (2004) and measured innovation productivity by the number of patents per 
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unit of R&D spending. Consistent with the existing literature (Griliches, Pakes & Hall, 1987) 
and following recent studies, we also included the number of patents (Choi, Park & Hong, 2012) 
and R&D intensity (Chen & Hsu, 2009) as proxies for innovation as dependent variables. 
Following Khanna and Palepu (2000b) and Singh and Gaur (2009), we considered the 
percentage of shares held by the founding family as an individual or group to be a proxy for 
family ownership concentration, which was an explanatory variable. In addition, our estimation 
consisted of a dummy variable representing family firm, which was coded as 1 if the minimum 
threshold of family ownership of 20 percent5 was met, and 0 otherwise. To understand the effect 
of business groups (business house) we calculated three interaction terms depending on whether 
the firm has family ownership and falls into one of the three following main categories (available 
from PROWESS): top 50 business groups, large business group and others. The business group 
is a dummy variable (1 if the firm is affiliated to any business group, and 0 if otherwise) based 
on business group size and group activities.  
A number of control variables were included6. The prior literature on family business shows 
that ‘family ties’ (an important intangible resource, according to the resource-based perspective) 
and common interest alignment and emotional attachment (hard-to-imitate asset) may reduce 
agency costs between family members and their firms (Eddleston, Kellermanns & Sarathy, 
2008). When a family member often holds the CEO position and/or serves on the board of 
directors (Anderson & Reeb, 2003), the family ties to the firm are strengthened. Recent studies 
on emerging markets also show that, family CEOs are generally politically connected, which is 
of assistance in external funds and political bailouts (Faccio, Masulis & McConnell, 2006). To 
control for the effect of family members in management and control (apart from cash flow 
rights), we included a dummy variable set to 1 if a member of a founding family is in the CEO 
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position and 0 otherwise. This measure is based on hand-collected information from the annual 
reports and websites of the firms. The size of the firm indicates the present and future prospects 
for innovation (Craig & Dibrell, 2006). Momentary increases or decreases of sales provide a 
signal of firms’ innovation activities. We used a logarithm of sales as proxy for the size of the 
firms. The age of the firm is also important. Many studies on innovation have used the number 
of scientists, employees or age of the firm in this respect. We adopted a logarithm of age to 
control for the experience of the firm, following Cohen and Klepper (1996). The resource 
dependence perspective suggests that firm-level intangible resources influence innovation 
activities. Knowledge stock, an important intangible resource, significantly contributes to the 
distributed lag of current and past innovation activities (Blundell, Griffith & Van Reenen, 1999) 
because innovation depends largely on combinations of existing technological knowledge. Thus, 
we used the last 4 years’ patent numbers (calculated by the perpetual inventory method) to 
control for the effect of innovative knowledge stock. The corporate governance literature shows 
that foreign ownership of a firm indicates a significant extent of knowledge transfer from the 
international environment to that firm (Fernandez & Nieto, 2006). Therefore, we controlled for 
the shares of family firms owned by foreign corporate bodies and institutions. Chang, Chung, 
and Mahmood (2006) show that state-owned firms have significant access to important 
infrastructure provided by the innovation policy of their government. Therefore, we also 
controlled for the percentage of governmental shareholding. Family firms in business groups can 
be a single and independent legal entity or conglomerates that operate in different sectors. Unlike 
conglomerates, family group firms often share structural features across firms (Khanna & Yafeh, 
2005) that affect innovation. Therefore, we used firm-level data and not conglomerate-level data.  
Because, different industries have different technological and learning regimes that affect the 
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innovation capabilities of firms, we controlled for the industry effect by constructing industry 
dummies that equaled 1 if the firm belonged to the manufacturing, information technology or 
chemical industries7 and 0 if otherwise. SEBI implemented a new regulation in 2006 that 
requires listed firms to disclose detailed information on corporate governance and equity and 
share holdings. We, thus, used two year-span dummies for the 2001-2005 period and the 2006-
2008 period.  
From the literature of innovation, it is widely accepted that technological knowledge 
spillovers and factor demands are substitutes for one another because this flow decreases labor 
costs (Van Reenen, 1997). In a family business, in which lower levels of management hierarchy 
exist, employee compensation costs at the operational level are consequently higher than in non-
family firms. Werner et al. (2005) find that the compensation strategy is a function of ownership 
structure. Therefore, we used the average compensation and wage intensity (measured by wages 
over sales) over the last 5 years as instruments. In addition, we also included the last 5 years 
moving average assets of the firm as another instrument. Along with these three instruments, we 
instrumented the endogenous regressor, i.e., family ownership in the system GMM model, by a 
variable business risk that was constructed from the standard deviation of sales divided by total 
assets because family firms affiliated with business groups generally diversify business risks 
among group members.  
 
Specification of Econometric Model 
Because most empirical corporate governance studies show both positive and negative effects of 
family ownership on firm innovation, King and Santor (2008) recently argued that this might be 
because of misspecifications of the model (simultaneity) and incorrect model estimation because 
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of unobserved firm heterogeneity that biases the results. These factors are recognized as a 
potential source of endogeneity. 
To solve the endogeneity problem in this study, we aim to improve the existing econometric 
model in empirical corporate governance literature by revising the basic knowledge production 
(for innovation) model used in the innovation literature. Specifically, to examine the relationship 
between family ownership and innovation, we begin with the knowledge production function 
developed by Griliches (1979) and then modify it according to our research questions.  
The knowledge production function we have undertaken is generally used to examine the 
impact of investment on a firm’s R&D and patent applications. Prior studies have estimated a 
“static” model of the form:  innovation=f(ownership percentage, firm characteristics, fixed 
effects), that can be formally written as:  !!" = !! + !!!!" +  !!! + !! + !!"                                               (1) 
where !!" is the innovation productivity of firm i in time t because of the input for innovation 
(e.g., percentage change in share holdings) of the firm, assuming that the firm maintains other 
input factors constant over the period of this study. !! captures the effect of the percentage of 
shares held by owners of the firm and !!" is a vector of firm-specific factors that determine the 
ownership structure that are assumed to be associated with innovation activities (directly or 
indirectly) and includes the treatment variables. V indicates industry dummies, whereas !! 
implies the dummies for each time span (not exactly a time counter, but a time counter of each 
period, e.g., 2001-2005 and 2006-2008). !!" is the idiosyncratic error and is an unobservable term 
of firm i in time t.   
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Analytical Techniques 
Following the previous studies on family businesses (e.g., Villalonga & Amit, 2006), we began 
with traditional fixed- and random-effect models. The panel nature of our data allows us to 
control for any unobserved variables (e.g., institutional differences) that change over time but not 
across family firms. We used fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity. The effect of 
the time invariant covariates did not appear in fixed-effect regression models (not reported) 
because the effect is cancelled out by the within transformation. Therefore, it is difficult to 
identify whether family firms hold more shares (i.e., more cash flow rights) as a result of 
superior performance of the firm or because of the return on their investment (including personal 
wealth) to the firm because successful innovations may trigger more investment in the firm. If 
simultaneity exists, the family ownership variable would be biased upward. In the fixed-effects 
model we permitted the family ownership variables to be correlated with random individual 
specific effects, which should minimize the endogeneity. Thus, if the decision of family 
ownership is correlated with certain unobserved variables, we can assume that they are correlated 
with only time-invariant components of the unobserved variable that are captured by the 
individual family firm-specific effects. In other words, the fixed-effects model might give us 
consistent estimates of the marginal effect of regressor, provided the regressor is time varying 
(even if it is endogenous). As an alternative, following Gaur and Kumar (2009), we used 
random-effects estimations of the level Equation (1), and these are reported in Table 3. The 
random-effects models provide more efficient estimates than the fixed-effect models in the 
absence of any correlation between time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity and the regressors. 
This model allows us to examine the variations among cross-sectional units simultaneously with 
25 
variations among individual units over time. The Hausman test shows the justification of using 
the random-effect models8.  
Addressing Endogeneity Issues 
A large number of empirical studies on corporate governance recognize ownership structure as 
an endogenous variable (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). We find that the coefficient of family 
ownership is not robust to inclusion of fixed-effects (industry or firm). That is, family ownership 
and innovation are determined by common factors, some of which are unobservable to 
econometricians. Moreover, the family owners of a firm would prefer to obtain all inputs for 
innovation without any problem. For instance, Munari, Oriani, and Sobrero (2010) show that 
managers are likely to prefer a firm’s resources to low-risk R&D projects. In fact, because the 
family owners might have insider information about their firm, performance-based compensation 
would influence the innovation outputs. Therefore, expected innovation and technological 
progress can also shape the family ownership structure, which leads to reverse causality. In the 
current context, this endogeneity problem may also occur because the current value of family 
ownership is a function of the past innovation of the firm. Thus, the regression results would be 
spurious if we do not carefully address these endogeneity concerns.  
We respond to the endogeneity problem by rewriting our empirical Model (1) as the 
following: innovation=f(past innovation activities, ownership percentage, firm characteristics, 
fixed effects), which leads us to the following two broad goals of this study: (1) to understand the 
“dynamic” relationship between family ownership and innovation and (2) to estimate this 
dynamic model in this context. These issues can be addressed through several approaches by 
following prior studies in similar situations. For example, Smith et al. (1997) control for 
simultaneity by analyzing the data with two-stage Tobit least-square methods, whereas Mueller 
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et al. (2003) use a binary logit regression. Generally, compared to the average investors families 
(or promoters), have longer stakes in their firms, which allows them exceptional foresight in 
predicting future firm performance (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). Thus, family ownership is 
potentially correlated with all error terms, time varying components and firm-specific fixed 
effects. In recent years, Benfratello and Sembenelli (2006) have used an IV-GMM technique to 
examine foreign ownership on total-factor productivity of Italian manufacturing firms. Becuase 
the instruments help find the exogenous variables uncorrelated with the dependent variable and 
strongly correlated with the endogenous variables, the IV-GMM estimator solves the moment 
conditions that impose orthogonality between the error term and the set of instruments (including 
the exogenous regressors).  
In this study, we address endogeneity in two phases. In the first phase, we adopt the two-
stage least square (2SLS) estimator (without including the past innovation activities of firms) 
using the following three instruments: last 5 years total assets, employee compensation and wage 
intensity (see Table 7 for definition). The regressions show us the positive effects of family 
ownership on innovation productivity, as opposed to the random-effects panel models reported in 
Table 3. However, the results are not statistically significant; nonetheless, it provides some 
indication that support the instruments.  
In the second phase, we apply a dynamic generalized method of moment (GMM) estimator 
as proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991)9 to our panel to estimate the relationship between 
family ownership and innovation. Unlike 2SLS or random- (or fixed-) effects panel regression- 
because current innovation activities are influenced by past family ownership and associated 
innovation- it may be possible to use some combination of variables from a firm’s history as a 
valid instrument in this dynamic GMM methods to account for simultaneity (Wintoki, Linck & 
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Netter, 2012). Thus, the use of ‘internal’ instruments contained within the panel itself eliminates 
the search for external instruments. Moreover, unlike ordinary least square (OLS) estimation, we 
can include firm-fixed effects to account for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. 
Therefore, we further improve our model following a similar model by Shyam-Sundar and 
Meyers (1999). The model is presented below and the derivation is shown in the appendix.  !!" = !!!!(!!!)! + !!Ζ!,!"! + !!" + !! + !! + !!" ,   ! > 0                                    (2) 
In this model, we consider the lags in innovation and for unobserved individual factors that 
are time-variant by allowing !!" = !!!(!!!) + !!" to be the first-order autoregressive process, ! < 1. 
In particular, the basic estimation has the following two steps: we use a difference-GMM 
estimator (Blundell & Bond, 1998) that allows us to eliminate the potential endogeneity because 
of time invariant unobserved heterogeneity. The first differenced Model (3) is estimated by 
GMM using the lagged values of independent variables as instruments.  
?!!" = !!?!!(!!!)! + !!ΔΖ!,!"! +?!!" +?!!" ,   ! > 0                                    (3) 
However, Arellano and Bover (1995) note that that the variables in levels may be weak 
instruments for first-differenced models. Therefore, to overcome this problem, we include the 
equations in levels in the estimation methods. In other words, the first-differenced variables are 
used as instruments for equations in levels in a system of equations that include the equations in 
both levels and differences (Wintoki, Linck & Netter, 2012). This method is called system-GMM 
estimation. 
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The collinearity test indicates that none of the variables has a variance inflation factor (VIF) 
greater than 5, which rules out the multicollinearity. Tables 1 and 2 represent the correlation 
matrix and the summary statistics, respectively, of the continuous variables of interests. From the 
correlation matrix, we see that family ownership is positively correlated with innovation 
productivity. Moreover, the family ownership is negatively associated with size (total sales) and 
age of the firm. This suggests that older firms invest more in invention activities.  
 
_____________________ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
_____________________ 
_____________________ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
_____________________ 
 
The summary statistics from 395 listed firms show that 278 firms are family owned and 197 
firms are affiliated with business groups. Families in family firms hold a maximum of 80 percent 
shares whereas the group-affiliated family firms hold a maximum of 72 percent of equity shares. 
Obviously, firms holding more than 72 percent are stand-alone firms. In terms of innovation 
activities, the mean of innovation productivity and R&D intensity are higher for the stand-alone 
firms compared to business groups. Notably, the family firms are younger than non-family firms, 
whereas total sales and total assets are lower in family firms than in non-family firms. We have 
also performed a t-test of the difference of means and the findings show that most of the 
variables are statistically significant. 
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_____________________ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
_____________________ 
 
Table 3 shows the general linear square (GLS) random-effects model estimation of Equation 
(1). We documented the results separately for the group firms and stand-alone firms in Table 3. 
The coefficients of overall family ownership (including both group-affiliated and stand-alone 
firms) are negative for both the number of patents and innovation productivity. This is consistent 
with results from the previous studies on emerging markets (Chen & Hsu, 2009) and on 
developed economies (Munoz-Bullon & Sanchez-Bueno, 2011) that find a significant and 
negative relationship between family ownership and innovation. Although, the model may 
explain large variations in the data, which are indicated by high R-squared, the estimates might 
be heavily biased because of unobserved heterogeneity (becuase !!" and !!" are correlated). 
Suppose the idiosyncratic error varies over individuals and time, such that !!" = !! + !!" 
where !! is the founding family specific time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, e.g., 
unobserved family culture that remains constant over time. However, the estimates continue to 
violate the assumption of random-effects estimators that !!" is uncorrelated with both !! and !!". 
 
_____________________ 
Insert Table 4 about here 
_____________________ 
 
The firm’s dominant shareholders, in general, give importance to human capital to shape 
managerial decisions to allocate resources efficiently, particularly during an economic crisis. 
Feliciano and Lipsey (1999) give importance to the wage differentials between domestic- and 
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foreign-owned firms. Thus, we used three instruments- the last 5 years average of total assets of 
the firm, the last 5 years average of employee compensation and the wage intensity (as computed 
by executives and employees salaries, bonuses and other benefits over total sales of the firm)- for 
the family ownership. Table 4 reports the two-stage least square (2SLS) instrumental variable 
regression. For the relevance of the instruments used, we reported the first stage regression 
summary in Table 4, which shows that at least one instrument is significant at the 0.1% level. 
The validity of the instruments was also checked with the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. Under the 
null hypothesis, the endogeneity should not affect the OLS estimator (not reported), which 
indicates !!"# is consistent and efficient, whereas !!" is consistent but inefficient. However, 
Model 3 of Table 4 shows the rejection of family ownership exogeneity. We employed three 
instruments for the family ownership variable. If at least one instrument is valid, then it is 
necessary to test whether other instruments are uncorrelated with the error term in the second 
stage. From the test reported in Table 4, we could not reject the over-identifying restriction. 
Instead, we expect either all or no instruments be valid. In Table 4 (Model 2 and Model 4) we 
also reported the limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimator to rule out the 
presence of weak instruments. Although the 2SLS regression indicates that no family ownership 
variable is significantly associated with firm innovation, it supports the argument that family 
ownership and family CEO are endogenously determined. Moreover, we have a good indication 
that there is a positive impact of family ownership concentration on innovation productivity.  
From equation (1), one may argue that the causality may run in both directions, e.g., higher 
productivity may offer an incentive to family owners to invest more in R&D or with the help of 
more investment in innovation activities, productivity may be increased. Thus, the regressors are 
correlated with the error terms. In this case, the fixed-effects instrumental variable regression 
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might be effective. However, the first stage statistics of the regression (results in Table 4) shows 
that the instruments are weak and consequently a biased estimator is obtained. Therefore, in the 
presence of the non-iid (independent and identically distributed) errors we used system-
Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM)10 for equation (2) as developed by Arellano and 
Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The GMM estimators, reported in Table 5, give 
consistent and efficient estimates because the moment conditions use an optimal weighting 
matrix that maximizes its asymptotic variance (see Baum, Schaffer & Stillman, 2003). Moreover, 
with additional instruments for the equation in levels, system-GMM is more efficient than 
difference-GMM. We further controlled for unobserved heterogeneity between large and small 
firms by allowing an autoregressive component in the error term.  
_____________________ 
Insert Table 5 about here 
_____________________ 
In Table 5, we included three proxies for innovation, which are number of patents, R&D 
intensity and innovation productivity. We found that the family ownership concentration is 
positively associated with innovation outcome of the sample firms (e.g., Model 5: ! = 0.01, p < 
0.05 and Model 6: ! = 0.03, p < 0.001). However, the coefficient of family ownership is 
negatively correlated with the number of patents, as shown in Model 1 and Model 2 (Model 1: ! = −0.27, p < 0.05 and Model 2: ! = −0.22, p < 0.001). We thus further analyzed the 
interaction effects of family ownership concentration and a dummy denoting the subset of family 
ownership with a threshold value of 20 percent shareholding and find that the role of family 
ownership is consistent with the existing literature (Faccio & Lang, 2002). The result of Model 6 
in Table 5 provides support for Hypothesis 1 by indicating that the family ownership 
concentration positively affects the innovation productivity of publicly listed family firms at the 
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0.1 percent significance level (Model 6: ! = 0.17, p < 0.001), which is consistent with the 
literature discussed in the hypothesis development section. With respect to the institutional 
perspectives that focus on the origin of business groups because of the weak institutional 
framework in India, we examined the role of business group affiliation of these family firms. 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that business groups have a positive influence on family firms promoting 
innovation. Our findings show that the family firms affiliated with only the top 50 business 
groups play a positive and significant role in innovation productivity, as reported in Model 7. 
Thus, all other things being equal, this result is consistent with our prediction in Hypothesis 2 
(Model 6: ! = 0.16, p < 0.01). In Model 10 we tested our hypotheses in a full model by 
including all the independent variables together. We found that there was an improved effect of 
family ownership and affiliation with business group on innovation. The p-value of the first- and 
second-order autocorrelation tests (!! and !!) indicates no second order serial correlation and the 
Sargan test confirms that all the instruments11 support the analysis. 
Several results of the control variables are notable. Models 6-10 show that the variable family 
CEO negatively impacts innovation productivity. This result supports the agency theory that too 
dominant family control (or possible CEO duality) has a negative influence on innovation 
activities of firms and is consistent with previous studies (e.g., Chen & Hsu, 2009). We reported 
these results in Model 6-9 (e.g., Model 6: ! = −0.35, p < 0.001). Firm size shows a negative 
and significant impact on innovation productivity. This might imply that strong reliance of 
family trust decreases as the firm grows and this further decreases the effects of family control 
on innovation. Although small firms may have difficulty in securing adequate collateral to obtain 
external financing for innovation, affiliating with business groups provides them with the ability 
to access internal capital markets. Thus, consistent with the literature on developed countries 
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(Acs & Audretsch, 1988), small and medium size firms (SMEs) are more innovative than large 
firms in emerging markets. Moreover, these SMEs are much faster to react to the changing and 
emerging technological market niches than large firms. However, in our study, family firms are 
not necessarily SMEs. Thus, it is possible that as a family business grows, it becomes more 
diversified, which may affect its innovation activities. 
_____________________ 
Insert Table 6 about here 
_____________________ 
Robustness Checks 
In the robustness tests, we reported the coefficients estimated with different specifications of the 
variables in Table 6. We checked 10 percent and 30 percent threshold values of stake holdings 
by the founding family of the firms. In both cases, we found a positive impact of family 
ownership on innovation (Model 1: ! = 0.02, p < 0.001 and Model 2: ! = 0.08, p < 0.05). In 
our data, we found that approximately 40 percent of total firms belong to the manufacturing 
industry. Thus, we controlled for this particular industry to ascertain whether our results were 
driven by it. The results (Model 1 and Model 2) are consistent with the previous findings. As 
discussed in the theoretical framework, financial and accounting data -including ownership 
structure -become more precise after the amendment of the disclosure rule in 2005-2006. To 
capture this effect, we included two dummy variables that indicated the two periods, i.e., 2001-
2005 and 2006-2008. In Model 4, we found that the effect of family ownership on innovation 
productivity with a minimum of 20 percent stake holdings substantially increased after 2006 
(Model 4: ! = 0.31, p < 0.01). The results for non-family firms (in which family owners hold 
less than 20 percent of equity) are also reported in Column 5 and 6 of Table 6. 
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For emerging and transitional economies, foreign partners often provide domestic firms with 
advanced technology, management skills and other resources beyond financial support (Choi et 
al., 2011). Studies on Chinese firms show that an increase in foreign ownership is positively 
related with successful industrial growth (Peng, 2000). In India, with a large proportion of family 
firms, the government allows the entry of foreign MNCs to access advanced foreign technology. 
Foreign ownership also acts as a crucial driver for reform in corporate governance and 
institutional framework development in emerging markets (Choi et al., 2011). Moreover, in the 
emerging markets, governments facilitate technology absorption among local firms through 
various support policies (Mahmood & Rufin, 2005). Chang et al. (2006) show that, the state-
owned firms have significant access to important infrastructure provided by the governmental 
innovation policy, although the nature of government’s choices is driven by both social and 
political goals. Therefore, in emerging markets, state ownership can provide greater protection to 
shareholders when legal protection for minority shareholders is weak (Sun, Tong & Tong, 2002). 
Thus, the government acts as a mediator to minimize the agency problem when it is linked with 
firms through equity holding. This is the case in India where the majority of family ownership 
takes advantage of both foreign partners and the government. We found that foreign and state 
ownership are both positively associated with innovation output in family firms.		
Although we attempt to investigate the effects of family ownership on innovation (measured 
by patents-to-R&D expenses ratio), it is also notable to test the effects of those family firms 
without active patent information. Thus, there might be a possibility in modeling firms without 
any patent information by using a Heckman correction and including an inverse Mill’s ratio in 
the regression. We performed that exercise and found no significant differences from our 
reported results (Table 5). In summary, our results are robust. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Main Findings and the Implications 
The existing studies highlight the need to investigate ownership structures and innovation in the 
context of institutional pressures to address the limitations of agency theory (Miller, Le Breton-
Miller & Lester, 2012). Our study provided empirical support for this relationship from emerging 
markets, such as India, in which the institutional framework is not well developed. We made 
three important contributions to the literature on family ownership and innovation. First, we 
examined the direct effect of family ownership on innovation of Indian listed family firms and 
showed that the institutional and external-resourcing perspectives might complement agency 
theory in a better way in this context. Second, we offered insights about how a business group 
affiliation of family firms influences the relationship between family ownership and innovation 
in India. Third, we adopted a more rigorous econometrics method by providing a panel analysis 
using a system GMM estimator and addressed endogeneity thoroughly, which therefore 
significantly improved the shortcomings of methodologies used in the previous literature. 
Using an unbalanced panel of 395 BSE-listed Indian firms during 2001- 2008, we found that, 
after controlling for possible endogeneity, the impact of family ownership on innovation 
productivity is positive. We further emphasized the business group affiliation of family firms and 
distinguished between innovation activities of group-affiliated and stand-alone family firms. We 
found that affiliation with the top 50 business groups increased the innovation activities of these 
family firms.  
Our results provide positive empirical support for the theoretical argument that Indian firms 
with majority family ownership may perform well with respect to innovation (Mueller & 
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Philippon, 2011). The positive association between family ownership and innovation further 
supports the findings of Sraer and Thesmar (2007) that family-owned firms are less sensitive to 
industry shocks. Furthermore, using the period dummy for 2006-2008, we provided empirical 
evidence that after the disclosure rule reformation in 2005-2006, the positive impact of family 
ownership on innovation (shown in robustness checks) is stronger than the previous period 
(2001-2005). This indicates that when more family firms become publicly listed and new 
disclosure rules are implemented, their true potential for innovation and financial performance 
might be better revealed. Therefore, our findings suggest that the Indian government should 
improve policies on information disclosure and establish more proper corporate governance 
mechanisms for family businesses.  
Our study also provides empirical evidence for the argument of CEO duality. Wong et al. 
(2010) and Anderson and Reeb (2003) find in developed markets that, if any member of the 
founder family serves as CEO or controls the majority of board seats, the stock of the firms 
reacts negatively in the stock market. Our study shows that family CEOs reduce innovation 
activities in India and thus provides evidence against CEO duality from an emerging market 
perspective. This also supports the evidence of tunneling in India (Bertrand, Mehta & 
Mullainathan, 2002) because strong family control may motivate the family to expropriate 
investments for R&D. However, the reason for this negative relationship may not be caused by 
the agency perspective as it is understood in developed economies, but from institutional and 
cultural perspectives. Generally, in India, it has been difficult for traditional family businesses to 
hire professional managers for top positions in their firms because of the lack of an effective 
labor market that can mobilize human resources. Further, the Indian business culture has been 
described as, “autocratic, sycophantic, emphasizing personal loyalties rather than professionals” 
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(Manikutty, 2000: 289). This is particularly true in emerging economies. Because CEO duality 
may have a negative impact on innovation, policy makers should consider improving the 
corporate governance code and further encourage family firms to have an independent and 
professional CEO.  
Our findings also indicate that innovation is impacted by ownership structure and by the lack 
of supporting institutional frameworks in emerging markets with concentrated family ownership 
such as India. Thus, policy makers must investigate the impact of institutional underdevelopment 
on innovation before reforming ownership structure. Moreover, family firms typically have good 
relationships with the major pillars of the local economy. Our findings may help policy makers 
to promote an alliance between family firms with research organizations- such as universities- to 
utilize fundamental scientific knowledge to enhance innovation capabilities in emerging markets. 
 
Limitations 
Although this paper tries to minimize the identification problem by employing certain key 
instruments in appropriate econometric models, it cannot fully overcome the causal effect of 
family firms on innovation activities. However, as Ornaghi (2009) argues, econometricians 
cannot always see the correct information to eliminate endogeneity problem. Our study is not an 
exception. First, there might be omitted variable bias that was difficult to address because of 
information availability, such as (1) political favors taken by founding families do not appear in 
the balance sheet but this might affect the performance of family firms and (2) low innovation 
performance might be the result of tunneling of capital out of the firm in a business group run by 
controlling families. Moreover, our results did not take into account the recent economic crisis.  
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 Second, with a sample of Russian (one of the BRIC countries) firms, Judge et al. (2003) 
noted that firm performance decreases when the board of directors is controlled by the CEO of 
the firm. The study of Villalonga and Amit (2006) also argue that the role of ownership can be 
examined clearly with information about both ownership and control. Although the enactment of 
Clause 49 (similar to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US) of Listing Agreements clarifies the 
composition of board of directors, we had only limited information of CEO and board structure 
throughout the study period in this study. This may bias our findings towards negative 
association of descendant CEO and innovation.  
Third, Indian family firms bring products and technologies to the market so frequently that 
they do not bother to apply for patents. Therefore, the history of past innovation activities is 
difficult to obtain to address endogeneity properly and specifically for the study of innovation in 
emerging markets. Moreover, it may also bias the measurement of innovation productivity if we 
only consider patented inventions because not all inventions are patented or novel enough to be 
eligible to be patented. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
Despite several limitations, our study has provided important insights into family firms in 
emerging markets in which the de facto institutional quality might better explain apparent 
contradictions about the role of family ownership in innovation. We show that using family 
owners to promote innovation in emerging markets such as India is worth recommending. 
Family firms, particularly when they are affiliated with business groups, can establish strong 
research partnerships with universities, research organizations and other industrial partners in 
emerging markets. Moreover, they can contribute to regional innovation systems (see Cooke, 
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Gomez Uranga & Etxebarria, 1997) which are conceptualized as an important hub of the 
innovation network that utilize dynamic relations and interactions with local firms. For instance, 
Bangalore in India has become the most important IT cluster outside of the OECD countries 
(Arora & Gambardella, 2004). One of the family firms in the Bangalore IT cluster is Infosys 
Limited, which successfully provides business consulting, technology and engineering 
outsourcing services in more than 30 countries. However, the lack of any significant positive 
association of families with the number of patents in our findings can be alarming for the 
economy. At first glance, it shows that family firms are generally reluctant to spend money and 
effort in applying for patents. However, when we further analyze the patent-to-R&D ratio and 
include it in a dynamic model, we find that family firms care about the transformation of their 
R&D effort into innovation output. The economic implication is that, even if the family firms 
engage in less external R&D investment than non-family firms, a proper collaboration and 
network of R&D can maximize successful innovation output with limited innovation input, 
which will lead to better innovation productivity for family firms. It shows that fewer 
registrations of the number of patents cannot simply be interpreted as lower-quality innovation 
productivity. 
Finally, the Indian financial markets have shown impressive growth in recent years as the 
government has committed to advancing corporate governance reforms, including SEBI’s 
initiative for transparency and good practice in corporate governance. The improvement of the 
corporate governance landscape in India, along with economic reformations and technological 
innovations, has helped Indian industry to sustain financial gains and growth. In addition, the 
transparency and reform in corporate governance in India may attract other equity investors to 
choose opportunity and potential investments with increased protection against expropriation. 
40 
Thus, the recent corporate governance measures taken by the Indian government seem to fill 
existing institutional underdevelopment to attract capital from a variety of external sources. This, 
indeed, may affect a large number of family firms in India12. In addition, Indian family firms 
may have a strong symbiotic relationship with the elected government and benefit from 
government protection (Khanna & Palepu, 1997). However, the continued presence of a large 
number of family firms implies a lack of trust of governmental action. In the post-liberalization 
period, growing competitive pressures from foreign firms and also imports have stimulated the 
innovation activities of Indian small- and medium-sized enterprises, which are also family 
owned. These small- and medium-sized enterprises are often provided with funds for technology 
development, modernization and technical know-how for innovation activities by the 
government.  
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TABLE 1 
Correlation Matrix 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Innovation productivity (1) 1.00 
       Family ownership (%) (2) 0.12* 1.00 
      Foreign ownership (%) (3) 0.03* -0.01* 1.00 
     Knowledge stock (4) 0.04*** 0.02* -0.02* 1.00 
    Total sales (5) -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 -0.05 1.00 
   Firm age (6) -0.07** -0.13*** 0.01 0.08 0.10*** 1.00 
  Total assets (7) -0.04 -0.05* -0.03 -0.04 0.83*** 0.11*** 1.00 
 Employee compensation (8) -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.07 0.42*** 0.10*** 0.55*** 1.00 
Notes: The numbers listed horizontally across the top row correspond to the number and variables listed vertically 
on the table. ***, ** and * represent a 0.1 percent, 1 percent and 5 percent significance level using two-tailed test, 
respectively. 
 
TABLE 2 
Summary Statistics 
Panel A Family Firms   Non-family Firms     T-Test 
Number of firms 278   117     
   Mean SD Max     Mean SD Max     Diff 
Innovation productivity 0.62 2.74 41.18     0.59 3.75 60.00     0.03* 
R&D intensity 0.10 3.12 125.60     0.01 0.02 0.19     0.09 
Number of patents 3.04 9.92 113.00     2.75 20.10 282.00     0.29* 
Family ownership (%) 5.69 14.16 80.18     0.45 2.13 19.17     5.24*** 
Indian corp. promoters (%)  4.90 14.23 78.58     3.53 11.71 73.70     1.37*** 
Foreign corp. promoters (%) 0.92 5.81 90.00     2.67 11.61 76.00     -1.75** 
Knowledge stock 287.25 314.44 1645.48 
 
387.68 999.49 4509.43     -100.40** 
Total sales 1181.57 6266.81 139269.46     4495.78 20315.20 270582.36     -3314.20 
Total assets  1404.74 6982.89 150149.41     3670.76 13466.44 136872.50     -2266.00** 
Firm age (years) 32.71 20.28 108.00     43.77 20.00 90.00     -11.06** 
Employee compensation 106.59 549.56 9553.51     231.62 711.03 8069.15     -125.00** 
    
    
  
      
Panel B Group Firms     Stand-alone Firms     T-Test 
Number of firms 197   198       
  Mean SD Max     Mean SD Max     Diff 
Innovation productivity 0.60 3.45 60.00     0.63 2.72 41.18     -0.03* 
R&D intensity 0.02 0.08 1.21     0.12 3.63 125.60     -0.10* 
Number of patents 4.34 18.89 282.00     1.56 5.79 69.00     2.79** 
Family ownership (%) 2.45 9.35 72.02     4.19 12.15 80.18     -1.73** 
Indian corp. promoters (%)  7.40 16.24 78.58     1.55 6.44 66.32     5.85*** 
Foreign corp. promoters (%) 1.16 6.42 51.59     2.47 11.48 90.00     -1.31** 
Knowledge stock 390.42 708.99 4509.43 
 
181.01 187.8 821.96     209.40*** 
Total sales 1699.18 7299.98 139269.46     2795.06 16410.78 270582.36     -1095.90* 
Total assets  1898.09 8022.15 150149.41     2368.95 10976.94 136872.50     -470.90** 
Firm age (years) 39.58 22.08 108.00     33.01 18.97 90.00     6.57*** 
Employee compensation 140.84 578.88 9553.51     152.79 637.58 8069.15     -11.95** 
Notes: Total number of firms 395. Family firms refer to those where the found families hold more than 20% of 
shares or the founding family members are in CEO position. Group firms are firms affiliated to business groups. 
T-test for statistically significant difference in means of two samples. ***, ** and * represent a 0.1 percent, 1 
percent and 5 percent significance level using two-tailed test, respectively.  
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TABLE 3 
Effect of Family Ownership on Innovation Productivity 
Dependent variables Number of patents   Innovation productivity 
Panel A: Group firms Model 1 Model 2 Model 3     Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Family Ownership (%) -0.12** 0.16 -0.27*     -0.17* -0.12* -0.05 
 
(0.15) (0.15) (0.67)     (0.02) (0.05) (0.07) 
Family Ownership (%)*dummy  
family holding min 20% 
  
0.56     
  
0.08 
   
(0.64)     
  
(0.07) 
Family CEO 
 
-1.17 -1.21     
 
0.19 0.20 
  
(4.19) (4.19)     
 
(0.81) (0.81) 
Firm size 1.66 1.69 1.56     -0.46* -0.42* -0.51* 
 
(1.35) (1.35) (1.36)     (0.25) (0.26) (0.26) 
Firm age -0.93 -1.29 -1.35     0.30 0.48 0.38 
 
(2.85) (3.14) (3.14)     (0.52) (0.58) (0.58) 
Knowledge stock 0.07*** 0.05*** 0.05***     0.10 0.11 0.09 
 
(0.09) (0.07) (0.02)     (0.12) (0.08) (0.21) 
Foreign ownership (%) -0.26 -0.25 -0.20     0.09 0.09 0.10 
 
(0.25) (0.25) (0.26)     (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Constant -16.76 -15.08 -11.74     3.97 3.74 4.00 
 
(12.94) (14.32) (14.75)     (2.15) (2.38) (2.42) 
Observation 178 178 178     164 164 164 
R-Squared 0.73 0.74 0.74     0.14 0.11 0.14 
Wald χ2 475.24*** 472.66*** 473.26***     33.96*** 34.88*** 31.24*** 
        Panel B: Standalone firms       
 
      
Family Ownership (%) -0.14* -0.10 0.06     -0.19* -0.19* -0.18 
 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.25)     (0.07) (0.11) (0.13) 
Family Ownership (%)*dummy  
family holding min 20% 
  
-0.15     
  
-0.06 
   
(0.22)     
  
(0.11) 
Family CEO 
 
8.27* 8.41     
 
-2.35 -2.34 
  
(4.13) (4.43)     
 
(1.72) (1.72) 
Firm size 1.29* 1.80** 1.80*     -1.21** -1.27** -1.23** 
 
(0.65) (0.69) (0.73)     (0.35) (0.41) (0.40) 
Firm age -12.31** -11.27** -11.20*     2.13 2.15 2.24 
 
(4.14) (4.13) (4.45)     (1.62) (1.73) (1.75) 
Knowledge stock 0.00 -0.00 -0.01     0.00 0.03 0.01 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)     (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Foreign ownership (%) 0.20* 0.27** 0.28**     -0.14 -0.11 -0.07 
 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11)     (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Constant 6.96** 5.98 4.90     0.15 0.56 0.08 
 
(13.13) (14.17) (15.45)     (5.64) (6.36) (6.57) 
Observations 62.00 62.00 62.00     58.00 58.00 58.00 
R-Squared 46.51 51.39 48.87     31.19 32.65 33.19 
Wald χ2 29.25*** 34.81*** 34.27***     22.73** 24.37** 23.95** 
Notes: The sample is an unbalanced panel of 395 firms that filed 7065 patents in different patent offices around the 
world during 2001-2008. The observation used is 2396.  
All models are estimated by GLS random-effect regressions. Cluster-robust standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * represent a 0.1 percent, 1 percent and 5 percent significance level using two-tailed test, 
respectively. Family ownership (%) variable is measured as the percentage shares held by Indian individual and 
Hindu undivided families (as individual or group). In all models Industry and year effect are included but not shown. 
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TABLE 4 
Effect of Family Ownership on Innovation 
Dependent variables Number of Patents      Innovation Productivity 
  2SLS LIML      2SLS LIML 
  Model 1 Model 2      Model 3 Model 4 
Family ownership (%) 2.72 3.80      2.58 0.33 
 
(2.66) (3.85)      (7.66) (0.22) 
Family CEO -0.49 -0.72      -0.80 -0.41 
 
(5.03) (5.24)      (2.07) (0.43) 
Family ownership (%)*Family 
firms -2.28 -3.30      -2.43 -0.32 
 
(2.46) (3.58)      (7.18) (0.20) 
Firm size 3.02* 3.12*      -0.13 -0.38* 
 
(1.27) (1.40)      (1.06) (0.18) 
Firm age -0.07 -0.16      0.81 0.14 
 
(3.82) (4.23)      (2.39) (0.27) 
Knowledge stock 0.05*** 0.05***      -0.00 -0.00 
 
(0.01) (0.01)      (0.00) (0.00) 
Foreign ownership (%) -0.31 -0.40      -0.37 -0.06 
 
(0.38) (0.48)      (1.06) (0.04) 
Constant -45.84 -48.67      -6.90 2.73 
 
(27.80) (31.82)      (33.53) (2.23) 
Observations 161 161      148 148 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
  
     
  χ2 (1) 32.67(p=0.10) 
 
     25.499 (p=0.01) 
F  12.28 (p=0.13) 
 
     14.175 (p=0.04)  
   
     
  Over identifying restriction 
  
     
  χ2 (2) 3.79 (p=0.15) 
 
     5.392 (p=0.26) 
 
   
     
  First stage regression 
  
     
  Adjusted R-squared 0.97 0.96      0.96 0.97 
F 
P 
12.25  
(0.00) 
10.25  
(0.04)      
12.31  
(0.01) 
9.31  
(0.00) 
Notes: The sample is an unbalanced panel of 197 firms affiliated to business groups during 2001-2008.  
All models are estimated by 2SLS and LIML regressions. Asymptotic standard errors robust to heteroscadasticity 
are shown in parentheses. ***, ** and * represent a 0.1 percent, 1 percent and 5 percent significance level using 
two-tailed test, respectively. Family ownership (%) variable is measured as the percentage shares held by Indian 
individual and Hindu undivided families (as individual or group). In all models Industry and year effect are included 
but not shown. 
The instruments applied for the equation are last 5 years average total assets, last 5 years average employee 
compensation and wage intensity (wage/total sales). Only firms affiliated to Business groups have been considered 
here. 
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N
um
ber of patents 
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D
 intensity 
     
Innovation productivity 
  
M
odel 1 
M
odel 2 
      M
odel 3 
M
odel 4 
     M
odel 5 
M
odel 6 
M
odel 7 
M
odel 8 
M
odel 9 
M
odel 10 
N
um
ber of patents (t-1)  
0.21*** 
0.21*** 
       
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.16) 
(0.00) 
       
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
R
&
D
 intensity (t-1)  
 
 
      0.56** 
0.52** 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      (0.17) 
(0.19) 
      
 
 
 
 
 
Innovation productivity (t-1)  
 
 
       
 
     0.29** 
0.32*** 
0.32*** 
0.25*** 
0.26*** 
0.27*** 
 
 
 
       
 
     (0.09) 
(0.03) 
(0.03) 
(0.03) 
(0.03) 
(0.03) 
Fam
ily ow
nership (%
) 
-0.27* 
-0.22*** 
      0.01 
0.01 
     0.01* 
0.03*** 
0.03** 
0.01* 
-0.01** 
0.04** 
 
(0.11) 
(0.01) 
      (0.00) 
(0.00) 
     (0.00) 
(0.01) 
(0.01) 
(0.06) 
(0.03) 
(0.07) 
Fam
ily ow
nership (%
)*Fam
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s 
 
-2.59** 
       
-0.01 
      
0.17*** 
0.07*** 
0.03 
0.10 
0.12*** 
 
 
(0.91) 
       
(0.05) 
      
(0.05) 
(0.71) 
(0.13) 
0.36) 
(0.52) 
Fam
ily ow
nership (%
)*dum
m
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top 50 B
G
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.16** 
 
 
0.19* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.08) 
 
 
(0.15) 
Fam
ily ow
nership (%
)*dum
m
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large B
G
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.06 
 
-0.06 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.06) 
 
(0.09) 
Fam
ily ow
nership (%
)*dum
m
y 
others B
G
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.04 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.09) 
 
Fam
ily C
EO
 
 
0.96*** 
       
0.02 
      
-0.35*** 
-0.34*** 
-0.25** 
-0.23*** 
-0.25*** 
 
 
(0.61) 
       
(0.01) 
      
(0.03) 
(0.04) 
(0.07) 
(0.06) 
(0.07) 
Firm
 size 
-0.29 
-0.84*** 
      -0.00 
-0.00 
     -0.09 
-0.08* 
-0.08* 
-0.11** 
-0.10** 
-0.09** 
 
(1.29) 
(0.06) 
      (0.00) 
(0.00) 
     (0.08) 
(0.03) 
(0.04) 
(0.03) 
(0.03) 
(0.03) 
Firm
 age 
-1.13 
1.09*** 
      -0.02 
-0.01 
     0.12 
-0.16** 
-0.14** 
-0.15 
-0.16 
-0.18* 
 
(2.48) 
(0.25) 
      (0.01) 
(0.00) 
     (0.16) 
(0.05) 
(0.05) 
(0.08) 
(0.08) 
(0.09) 
K
now
ledge stock 
-0.02* 
-0.01*** 
      0.00*** 
0.00** 
     -0.00 
-0.00** 
-0.00*** 
-0.00** 
-0.00* 
-0.04* 
 
(0.01) 
(0.00) 
      (0.00) 
(0.01) 
     (0.05) 
(0.10) 
(0.00) 
(0.00) 
(0.00) 
(0.00) 
Foreign ow
nership (%
) 
0.02 
0.02 
      0.02 
0.02 
     0.05 
0.06 
0.12 
0.14 
0.36 
0.39 
 
(0.06) 
(0.09) 
      (0.02) 
(0.03) 
     (0.28) 
(0.30) 
(0.35) 
(1.17) 
(1.17) 
(1.19) 
Sargan 
147.49 
149.33 
      152.78 
153.66 
     213.82 
222.51 
254.24 
230.30 
229.50 
231.26 
D
f 
23 
29 
      24 
29 
     24 
28 
33 
33 
33 
34 
p-Sargan 
0 
0.01 
      0.02 
0.05 
     0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.06 
0.05 
0.02 
z1  
0.07 
0.01 
      0.07 
0.07 
 
0.01 
0.01 
0.03 
0.02 
0.02 
0.00 
z2  
0.19 
0.19 
      0.62 
0.62 
  
0.65 
0.87 
0.45 
0.30 
0.27 
0.41 
N
otes to Table 5: The sam
ple is an unbalanced panel of 197 firm
s that filed patents in different patent offices around the w
orld during 2001-2008. A
ll colum
ns 
are estim
ated by system
-G
M
M
 estim
ator. A
sym
ptotic standard errors robust to heteroscadasticity and autocorrelation of arbitrary form
 are show
n in italics. ***, 
** and * represent a 0.1 percent, 1 percent and 5 percent significance level using tw
o-tailed test, respectively. For instrum
ents see notes to Table 4 and an 
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TABLE 6 
Robustness Checks 
Dependent variable Innovation productivity 
 
Business Groups 
 
Stand-alone 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4     Model 5 Model 6 
Innovation productivity (t-1) 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.41*** 0.37***     0.29* 0.49** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02)     (0.32) (0.13) 
Family ownership (%) 0.02*** 0.01** 0.09** 0.08**     0.02 0.03 
 
(0.01) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)     (0.03) (0.02) 
Family ownership*Family 
firm (holding 10% equity) 0.02*** 
   
    
 
 
(0.00) 
   
    
 Family ownership*Family 
firm (holding 30% equity) 
 
0.08* 
  
    
 
  
(0.00) 
  
    
 Family ownership*Family 
firm (holding 20% equity) 
  
0.29** 0.31**     -1.04 -1.56 
   
(0.15) (0.13)     (1.04) (1.02) 
Family CEO -0.14** -0.04 -0.04* -0.01**     0.51 0.44 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)     (1.27) (0.57) 
Firm size -0.18*** -0.21*** -0.17*** -0.22***     -0.54 -0.39* 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)     (0.31) (0.19) 
Firm age -0.22*** -0.28*** -0.17*** -0.25***     2.20 2.45 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)     (1.55) (1.17) 
Knowledge stock -0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00**     0.00 0.00** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)     (0.00) (0.00) 
State ownership (%) 2.57*** 3.27*** 2.42*** 3.38***     0.01 -0.01 
 
(0.15) (0.27) (0.39) (0.32)     (0.01) (0.01) 
Foreign ownership (%) 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***     0.00 -0.01 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)     (0.01) (0.01) 
Manufacturing inds.  -1.53 -1.64 -1.16 -2.18     
 
 
(1.15) (1.42) (1.27) (1.22)     
 Year 2001-05 dummy 
  
0.23*** 
 
    1.37** 
 
   
(0.04) 
 
    (0.37) 
 Year 2006-08 dummy 
   
0.09***     
 
0.07 
    
(0.02)     
 
(0.27) 
Constant 3.82** 4.22** 2.91* 4.74***     -3.74 -5.28 
 
(1.12) (1.39) (1.27) (1.20)     (3.63) (3.27) 
Observation 135 135 135 135     54 54 
Sargan 127.00 119.99 118.72 130.09 
 
125.78 132.44 
Df 26 26 25 25 
 
30 21 
p-sargan 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.02 
 
0.02 0.00 
z1 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.04 
 
0.06 0.03 
z2 0.62 0.37 0.44 0.29  1.00 0.96 
Notes to Table 6: The sample is an unbalanced panel of 197 group firms and 198 stand-alone firms in 2001-2008.  
All columns are estimated by system GMM estimator. Asymptotic standard errors robust to heteroscadasticity are 
shown in italics. ***, ** and * represent a 0.1 percent, 1 percent and 5 percent significance level using two-tailed test, 
respectively. The instruments applied for the equation are as Table 5. !! and !! shows the p-values of tests for first and 
second order serial correlation in the differenced residuals (Arellano and Bond tests for AR(1) and AR(2)) that are 
distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Sargan tests for over-identifying restrictions, computed 
as two-step estimates, is asymptotically distributed as a !! under the null of instrument validity. Degrees of freedom 
and p-values are also reported.  In all the models, year and industry dummies are included, if not specified.  
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TABLE 7 
Variable Definitions 
Variables  Construct 
Innovation Productivity Number of patents/R&D expenses 
R&D intensity R&D expenditure/Sales 
Family Ownership (%) 
 
Percentage of all classes of shares held by the family  
(shareholding of Individuals and Hindu Undivided Family) 
 as an individual or as a group 
 
Family Firms Dummy indicates 1 if founding family holds minimum of 20% shares 
 
Family CEO 
 
Dummy indicates 1 if founding family member(s) is CEO or in BoD  
Family Ownership (%)*dummy 50 BG 
 
 
 
Interaction term indicating the top 50 business groups  
affiliated firms with family ownership 
 
Family Ownership (%)* dummy large BG 
 
 
Interaction term indicating the large business groups  
affiliated firms with family ownership 
 
Family Ownership (%)* dummy other BG 
 
 
Interaction term indicating the others business groups  
affiliated firms with family ownership 
 
Foreign Ownership (%) Percentage of common shares owned by foreign individual, corporate bodies 
State Ownership (%) Percentage of common shares owned by State Government 
Firm size Log of total sales 
Firm age Log of firm's age 
Knowledge Stock  Number of patents in last 4 years assuming 15% annual depreciation and an 8% growth backward in times 
Wage Intensity Wage/Sales 
Employee Compensation Last 5 years average employee compensation 
Total Assets (Moving average) Last 5 years average total assets 
Industry Dummy 1 if the firm belongs to Manufacturing, IT or chemical industry, 0 otherwise 
Notes: The industry dummy is created by using National Industry Classification (NIC) code available in Prowess 
database. Patents is obtained from PATSTAT. Ownership and other information is obtained from Prowess. 
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Appendix 
We consider that the firm follows the condition given below for its long-term innovation activities 
in the market  !!" − !!(!!!) = ! !!"! − !!(!!!) + !!"                                                              (1) 
Where, !!(!!!) is the productivity in (t-1) and !!"! is the target productivity of the firm in terms of 
both increased investments in R&D and number of patents, assuming that the firm employs its 
maximum investments of its shareholders in the innovation activities.  ! determines the speed of 
productivity adjustment coefficient and 0 ≤ ! ≤ 1.  
The following situations may happen: 
If ! < 1, the firm has excess inventions for patenting at time t and it does not want to increase 
its productivity in near future, while ! = 0 indicates that the firm believes that its present 
productivity can place it in better market place in future i.e. !!"! = !!!. However, ! = 1 means that 
the firm has a plan to increase its productivity because its present R&D activity is not enough to get 
the competitive advantage in future.  
This leads us to get an optimal level of production of firm that can be represented by the 
following equation !!"! = !!Ζ!,!"!,! + !!" + !!! + !! + !!"                                       (2) 
Where, !!" is the vector of firm’s unobservable individual characteristics, !! is the industry 
dummies for k industry. !! indicates the year spell dummies and !!" is the iid error term. 
Plugging equation (2) into equation (1), we obtain 
!!" − !!"!! = ! !!Ζ!,!"!,! + ! !!" + ! !!! + ! !! + ! !!" − !"!"!! + !!"                           (3) 
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or, 
 !!" = (1− !)!!(!!!) + !"!Ζ!,!"!,! + ! !!" + ! !!! + ! !! + ! !!" + !!"                      (4) 
Rearranging we get,   !!" = !"!(!!!) + !!Ζ!,!"!,! − ! !!Ζ!,!(!!!)!,! + !!" − !!! !!! + !! 1− ! + !! − !!!!! +!!"                         (5) 
For unobserved individual factors that are time-variant, e.g. the technological knowledge of the 
scientists in R&D, we allowed !!" = !!!(!!!) + !!" , to be first order autoregressive, ! < 1. 
After simplifying and allowing Yit variable for p years of lags,  !!" = !!!!(!!!)! + !!Ζ!,!"!,! + !!" + !! + !! + !!" ,    ! > 0                                 (6) 
Where, ! = 1− ! ,  !! = !!! ,   !!" = !!!" , !! = ! !!! ,   !! = ! !! ,   !!" = (! !!" + !!") 		 	
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Notes																																																									1	In this study, our focus is on publicly traded family-controlled businesses, in which non-family individuals or 
institutions hold some of the equity. 
2 See (Khanna & Palepu, 2000b, page 870) for more discussion. 
3 A comprehensive database that contains data on firms’ accounts, backgrounds, corporate governance and share prices 
since 1990 for large number of companies. The database includes all firms traded on India’s major stock exchanges 
(and several other smaller exchanges), including public sector enterprises. The database has been used by several papers 
on Indian firms, such as  Khanna and Palepu (2000b); Sarkar and Sarkar (2000); Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan 
(2002), etc. 
4 We have also taken the help of Magerman et al. (2009). 
5 Some studies establish a minimum control threshold such as 5, 10 or 20 percent for family-owned firms (Faccio & 
Lang, 2002; La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes & Shleifer, 1999). 
6 All the variables with their definitions and data sources are shown in Table 7. 
7 These industries have the maximum number of patents in the sample 
8 The conventional Hausman test assumes the asymptotic normality of both fixed and random effect estimators, which 
may not be true in all situations. We also tried to ascertain t the significant differences between these two estimators by 
a bootstrap Hausman test. Using the fixed-effect estimators did not support our findings. 
9 Although Griliches and Mairesse (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) argue that first-differences are possibly 
weakly correlated with their lagged levels for production function estimation regressors because many economic 
variables evolve in a random walk fashion at the micro level. Thus, the GMM estimator may not give consistent results. 
10 We have also used the difference GMM as literature in similar contexts recommends; the suggestion may be made 
because the lagged levels of the regressors act as weak instruments for the first differenced regressors. Alternatively, 
“system GMM”, an augmented version of “system GMM”, was used to help obtain efficient estimates for equation (2). 
11 Instruments used are the average assets for the last 5 years; average employee compensation for the last 5 years and 
the lagged value of all the regressors. 
12 We thank one of the reviewers for noting this. 	
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